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The emergence of an anti-austerity hashtag across 
Europe’s twittersphere 
Max Hänska and Stefan Bauchowitz
m@haenska.net 
Reference: Hänska, Max and Stefan Bauchowitz (2018) “#ThisIsACoup: The Emergence of an 
Anti-Austerity Hashtag across Europe’s Twittersphere” in L Basu, S Schiﬀeres, and S Knowles 
(eds.)  The Media and Austerity: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 248–61, Routledge. 
Abstract 
Social media allow disparate groups to spontaneously coordinate in support of a common 
cause. At the height of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis in 2015, as Greece was negotiating its third 
bailout and was about to be saddled with new austerity measures, the hashtag #ThisIsACoup 
emerged and quickly went viral on Twitter. How did it emerge and diﬀuse across Europe’s 
twittersphere – and with what impact on wider public discourse? This chapter uses data collected 
through Twitter’s streaming API and a qualitative content analysis to examine these questions. 
#ThisIsACoup first emerged in Spain. Within hours, people across Europe had coalesced 
around the hashtag, which succinctly expressed the shared sentiment that Greece was being 
treated unfairly. Moreover, the impact of #ThisIsACoup on public discourse reached well beyond 
social media, with more than700 newspaper stories worldwide mentioning the hashtag. 
But people did more than adopt a common hashtag. They engaged with other Twitter 
users across national boundaries, calling into being a transnational, pan-European 
communication space. Social media provided a potent means of connecting people from across 
Europe to voice their collective objection to controversial austerity policies. Through the hashtag, 
Twitter acted as a ‘stitching technology’, activating disparate, far-flung groups around a shared 
grievance. 
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Introduction and context 
Since 2010 the fiscal and economic crisis has severely aﬀected the fortunes of many 
Europeans, most of all in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, all of which underwent harsh 
economic adjustments, often in exchange for bailouts organized by Eurozone countries, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Commission. Public services had to yield 
to the new orthodoxy of fiscal restraint, while governments propped up banks, outraging many 
and irking most citizens. The Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis is, of course, ongoing as we write. 
The prescription of austerity triggered protests around the world. From the Occupy movement, 
to the Spanish Indignados, Greek Aganaktismenoi, and Portugese Geração, people coalesced 
around messages of resistance. Many of these anti-austerity protests coincided with the 
mainstream adoption of social media, which are frequently hailed as a harbinger of 
empowerment, amplifying the voice of crowds, and extending their ability to organise. And so, 
Europe’s austerity policies grabbed headlines as much as they featured on social feeds, activating 
citizens to engage in grassroots resistance to the mantra of fiscal restraint. 
The high-water mark of pan-European anti-austerity protests came while Greece was 
negotiating its third bailout in 2015. The country had only recently elected Syriza, a left-wing 
party, on a platform of rejecting the punishing conditionalities of previous bailouts. Though 
assessing the parameters of the wider crisis is beyond this chapter’s scope, it is important to set 
out the context of the disagreement in which protests emerged. The contention concerned the 
bailout’s conditions. While the Greek government sought debt relief and a respite from creditor-
imposed austerity measures, creditors wanted stricter conditionalities, and would – if at all – 
discuss debt relief only once further austerity measures had been agreed. Over the first half of 
2015 both the Greek government and creditors had dug in their heels on the matter, unwilling to 
yield from their position. Successive pre-crisis governments had cooked the books, revelations of 
which triggered the need for the first bailout in 2010. Subsequent governments stood accused of 
lacking resolve when it came to implementing needed reforms. Trust between the Greek 
government and its creditors had all but vanished by the time circumstances necessitated a third 
bailout in five years. Having lost confidence in Greece, creditors used their credit line, on which 
Greece had become reliant, as leverage to extract what they deemed as necessary reforms. Yet 
neither bailouts nor economic adjustments have brought about the desired economic 
convalescence, though it is a matter of disagreement to what extent reforms have actually been 
implemented. 
Greece’s Syriza government blamed creditors (Germany and the IMF foremost amongst 
them) for imposing a bailout programme they claimed to be counterproductive and economically 
illiterate. The former Greek finance minister, Yannis Varoufakis, prominently espoused this view, 
colourfully describing the bailout programme as “economic asphyxiation” and “fiscal 
waterboarding” (Donnelly and Vlcek 2017). Instead, the Greek government demanded debt 
relief (the IMF and prominent economists have made similar demands) and more lenient terms. 
Yet creditors were reluctant to grant this wish, not only because they would lose the leverage they 
consider essential in getting the Greek government to implement reforms, but also because many 
of them would find it very hard to get their national parliaments to sign-oﬀ on debt relief for 
Greece. Some creditor countries pointed to the fact that they had to implement their own painful 
reforms, and that others are poorer than Greece or pay their citizens lower pensions. Wealthier 
countries like Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands would have found it similarly hard to find 
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a parliamentary majority to approve debt relief. Indeed, in 2015 the Finnish government was 
close to collapse over its approval for the third Greek bailout. 
We do not aim to adjudicate on the matter, but what should be clear is that political 
views on the Greek bailout diverged sharply, and the 2015 negotiations for a third bailout were 
amongst the most acrimonious and divisive to date. And so, amidst one of the deepest rift in the 
European Union’s history, as the third bailout threatened to go the way of the previous two, and 
the Syriza government came under ever-greater pressure to adopt policies that it had been elected 
to reject, it called a referendum on the terms of the proposed bailout. On 5 July these conditions 
were rejected by 61% of the vote. Public resistance was mounting. Once again the streets of 
Athens swelled with protesters, as those of Madrid, Barcelona, and Lisbon had previously. Just 
days before the negotiations for the third bailout were concluded, on 12 July 2015, the hashtag 
#ThisIsACoup emerged and quickly went viral on Twitter. It criticised the creditors’ demands and 
expressed support for the Greek government. How did it emerge? How did it diﬀuse across 
Europe’s twittersphere? What impact did it have on wider public discourse? Was this a unified 
form of pan-European protest? These are the questions that this chapter will explore. It does so 
by examining a sample of tweets collected through Twitter’s streaming API, and qualitative 
methods for textual analysis to examine a sample of prominent tweets and a sample of newspaper 
articles from across Europe. 
Twitter, hashtags and connective action 
Scholars have long taken an interest in the relationship between protests and media. 
Broadly speaking, one early strand of scholarship focused on the way protest movements were 
represented in the news media, noting that these often focused on the spectacle of protests in 
ways that tended to discredit them – what is sometimes referred to as the “protest 
paradigm” (Chan and Lee, 1984). A second strand focused on the relationship between protest 
movements and the media. Notably Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) distinguished between the 
relationship between the two on a cultural level (who controlled the narrative, the meaning of 
protest events), and a structural level (how much did they need each other, as news sources, to 
mobilise, or reach a larger audience). With the mainstreaming of the Internet and the increasing 
ubiquity of social media platforms attention shifted from the role of mass media, to the role of 
online platforms in protests (McCurdy, 2012). 
From the early 2000s onwards a sustained interest in the democratic, participatory 
potential of these new communication technologies emerged (Dahlgren, 2001; Dahlberg, 2004). 
Centring on the fundamental transformation in communicative aﬀordances engendered by the 
Internet and social media, scholars considered their impact on political participation. Unlike 
mass media with its vertically integrated production structures and multiple gatekeepers, social 
media is networked, aﬀording everyone with an Internet-enabled device the ability to publish a 
message that can potentially reach millions. The threshold for producing and disseminating 
media messages was radically reduced. But views on the impact of this communicative potential 
remained divided. While some saw little evidence that social media could catalyse deep political 
change (Gladwell, 2010), others were more optimistic about the transformative potential that 
social media could have on protests, political participation, and political change (Howard and 
Hussain, 2011). 
Most research has focused on the role of social media in shaping protest behaviour. In 
particular, much attention has been focused on the role of social media as an organisational tool 
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for mobilising and joining protests, and disseminating movement information. A range of studies 
has found that social media use is positively related to individual protest participation (Bennett 
and Segerberg, 2011; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). Others have 
focused on social media as a means of documenting protests and diﬀusing news about them 
(especially when they are not covered by the news media) (Hänska Ahy and Shapour, 2013). 
Indeed, social media may oﬀer opportunities for protests to become less reliant on news media 
when seeking to reach wider audiences. 
While the predominant focus has been on the role of social media in facilitating oﬄine 
protests, social media also plays an important role as platforms for opinion expression. Moreover, 
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or Instagram can become sites of protest 
themselves. Providing immaterial, virtual sites for protests, they allow users to publicly signal 
their view on a matter by sharing a story, image, or video, using a hashtag or updating a profile 
image with an overlay that indicates support for a cause. While some have argued that this kind 
of slacktivism, clicktivism, or hashtag activism has no real impact on political life and is 
motivated by a personal desire to feel engaged (Morozov, 2009) others have argued that it has 
more potential. Though expressing one’s view involves a lesser degree of engagement than 
physically participating in a protest, or even engaging in its long-term organisation, they argue 
that online opinion expression can catalyse conversations around the issue, and may even act as a 
gateway for more comprehensive forms of participation (Valenzuela, 2013). Perhaps more 
importantly, such individualized acts of online engagement can produce collective movements 
with macro-level coherence, which Bennett and Segerberg (2012) call “connective action”. 
Bennett and Segerberg’s distinction between collective and connective action is 
elucidating – and helps to explain how collective action problems are sometimes overcome 
online. Collective action is what many scholars of protest movements consider most desirable. It 
gets people to participate in sustained movements, with clearly defined goals, but usually requires 
a deeper organisational structure and a shared identity that coalesces people into the movement. 
Connective action gets people to contribute to a cause without requiring a shared identity (it 
allows individualized forms of activism), and without relying on a permanent organisational 
structure to broker connections. This describes the kind of contentious actions that rapidly 
emerge through social media. Connective action usually manifests when people share protest 
artefacts through online social networks such as hashtags (that can be shared easily, irrespective of 
your location, or embeddedness in a wider movement). Here social media platforms act as 
“stitching technologies”, facilitating the emergence of macro-level organization from disparate 
individuals, groups, and organisations (Bennett et al., 2014). 
On Twitter, a hashtag can be such an artefact through which connective actions emerge. 
Hashtags are keywords that allow users to label their messages in a way that clarifies a larger 
theme around which users coalesce. Hashtags allow users to share and tag relevant content, and 
thus to follow a particular issue, to learn about and engage with it (Gleason, 2013). Any word 
can become a hashtag (e.g. #Greece), but a hashtag such as #ThisIsACoup succinctly codifies the 
sentiment that Greece was being treated unfairly, and in that sense became a message in its own 
right. Hashtags as succinct messages expressing opinion, and indeed voicing protest, have grown 
in popularity. The hashtag #OccupyWallStreet was used in protests at social and economic 
inequalities after the 2008 financial crash and the subsequent public bailout of the financial 
industry (Tremayne, 2014). #BringBackOurGirls was started in the spring of 2014 by Nigerian 
activists to draw attention to 250 schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram. #BlackLivesMatter was 
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created by activists in 2013 after Trayvon Martin was killed in Florida. More recently Mexico’s 
former President Vicente Fox Quesada popularised #FuckingWall in response to Donald Trump’s 
eﬀorts to build a border wall with Mexico. #ThisIsACoup is another instance of a unique word 
compound used to distil a message, in this instance expressing protest at the way Greece was 
treated by its creditors. Importantly, such social media activity can also shape the agenda of the 
news media (Hänska Ahy, 2016). Hashtag activism, after all, has frequently featured in the news 
as interesting phenomena in its own right. 
In the context of Greece’s bailout negotiations the emergence of #ThisIsACoup is also of 
interest because social media are transnational in scope, and while the bailout negotiations 
dominated public discourse in Greece, they were also politically salient in European creditor 
countries, and indeed internationally. As noted, there was mounting opposition to the bailout in 
Finland and Germany, but also in the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, and the Baltic states. The 
negotiations featured heavily in the news across Europe. Furthermore #ThisIsACoup became an 
international cause célèbre, as the bailout negotiations attracted much attention beyond Europe’s 
shores. Unlike mass media, social media is not subject to the same kind of spatial constraints, in 
that communications can flow unhindered across national boundaries (Boyd, 2011). The 
transnational dimension of #ThisIsACoup is thus not only central to the protest, but also to its 
role in potentially facilitating a European public sphere. It should be noted that a longstanding 
area of research has studied the European public sphere, often lamenting its absence, as a pan-
European communication space is deemed essential to address the EU’s democratic deficit 
(Hennen, 2016; Koopmans and Statham, 2010). Twitter may thus stitch together diverse groups 
from across Europe into pan-European connective actions, giving rise to a European online 
public sphere. 
Data and methods 
The findings presented in this chapter are based primarily on a set of tweets collected 
through Twitter’s streaming API. Between 11-13 July 2015 we collected all tweets containing at 
least one of the following words: ‘eurogroup’, ‘eurogruppe’, ‘eurogrupo’, ‘eurogruppo’, 
‘eurogroupe’, ‘eurozone’, ‘grexit’, and ‘eurosummit’, without limiting ourselves to hashtags. We 
collected 703,423 tweets relating to the bailout negotiations, serendipitously capturing the 
emergence and spread of the #ThisIsACoup hashtag. There are several methods for inferring 
location data from user profiles and tweets. While some users geo-tag their tweets, most do not 
(Hecht et al., 2011). However, many users specify a location in their profile – and while users can 
enter any text, most use actual locations. We used a combination Google and Bing’s geocoding 
services to infer quantitative location data from user-specified location fields. Feeding each tweet’s 
user specified location fields into the geocode APIs, these return (possibly approximate) longitude 
and latitude. Of our sample, 434,590 tweets contained usable location data with 318,190 tweets 
originating in a EU country. Our enriched data allow us to map the geographic spread of the 
hashtag. As Twitter also facilitates interactions between users – for instance when one user 
retweets, quotes, or replies to a tweet – we are also able to map the geographic spread of the 
hashtag. For instance, if a Twitter user in Belgium tweets #ThisIsACoup, and another user in 
Greece retweets, replies, or quotes this tweet, we can take the four respective coordinates to trace 
the spatial and temporal spread of interactions that use the hashtag. 
To investigate the content of tweets using the hashtag, we extracted the 50 most retweeted 
tweets originating in key Eurozone countries, including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
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and UK, plus the US, and conducted a thematic analysis of them to identify common and 
recurring themes. The aim was not so much a rigorous quantification of themes, but rather to 
gain insight into the ideas users sought to express through their use of the hashtag. 
To investigate the impact of the hashtag on the international press, we conducted a search 
of the entire Factiva database for any article matching the keyword ‘thisisacoup’ between 12–25 
July 2015. Because Greek newspapers are not indexed by Factiva, we also searched the databases 
of the leading centre-right Kathimerini and the leading centre-left To Vima, using the same 
parameter. The search yielded 739 hits on the Factiva database and 10 for the two Greek 
newspapers, for 749 in total. We carried out a thematic analysis of the 10 most relevant articles 
(relevance as ranked by Factiva) published in key Eurozone countries, including France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and UK, plus the US. The idea, as with tweets, was not 
quantification, but to get a sense of how the hashtag was thematised in the press. 
Emergence and spread 
Unsurprisingly the hashtag was most prominently used in Greece, as revealed in Figure 1, 
which shows its relative frequency by country. Furthermore, the timeline of its rise and decline 
shows how the hashtag emerged in Spain before it spread to Greece, as illustrated by Figure 2. 
The figure also demonstrates that the hashtag peaked on the day of its emergence and ebbed 
significantly thereafter. This is in line with prevailing accounts of connective action, because 
sharing a protest artefact through social media is the primary mechanism through which such 
macro phenomena of collective dissent emerge. Social media allows the network to scale quickly, 
but also means that engagement can tail oﬀ rapidly. Looking at the broader picture of the bailout 
negotiations, it becomes clear that the trigger for the emergence of the hashtag was a 
combination of events. A leaked ‘Grexit’ paper, which had emerged from the German finance 
ministry, proposed a temporary exit of Greece from the Eurozone. The paper, presumably 
designed to signal that the German government was not bluﬃng and would not back down on 
its demands, was thus interpreted as a quasi-coup d’état against the Greek people, who had only 
just rejected the bailout’s terms in the 5 July referendum. News of this ‘Grexit’ paper had been 
making the rounds on Twitter the previous day (11 July). 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Figure 1: Relative frequency of hashtag by EU country 
Figure 2: Frequency of hashtag use over time, stacked by country.  
The earliest use of the hashtag appears to be by Sandro Maccarrone, a mathematics and 
physics teacher from Barcelona, who tweeted at 18:01 GMT that “the Eurogroup’s proposal is a 
disguised coup against the Greek people #ThisIsACoup #Grexit”. His username (#UErgonya) is a 
play on the word vergonya (‘shame’ in Catalan) and European Union.  
“La propuesta del eurogrupo es un golpe estado encubierto contra el 
pueblo griego #ThisIsACoup #Grexit”
– Sandro #UErgonya @smaccarrone, 6:01PM – 12 July 2015
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Several newspapers reported that Maccarrone, when asked, noted that the hashtag was not 
his idea alone, but conceived by a group of activists, and that it was pure chance that he was the 
first to use it (Ulrich and Schulz, 2015). However, the hashtag did not gain much traction at 
first. 
Only once it was used by the Catalan politician and mayor of Barcelona Ada Colau at 
19:02, an hour after Maccarrone first tweeted it, did #thisIsACoup take oﬀ. Colau’s Twitter 
account acted as a node, brokering connections between otherwise disjointed networks, to 
amplify and rapidly scale the use of the hashtag across Europe. She tweeted “Greece wants to be 
in Europe, wants to pay its debt and negotiate. But it also wants respect, democracy and human 
rights. I’m with Greece #thisIsACoup.” 
“Grecia quiere estar en Europa, quiere pagar deuda y negociar. Pero 
quiere tb respeto, democracia y DDHH. Yo Estoy con Grecia #thisIsACoup”
 – Ada Colau @AdaColau, 7:02PM – 12 July 2015
That the hashtag originated in Spain was also reported, amongst others, by the Guardian 
and Süddeutsche Zeitung. While a sizeable proportion of tweets using the hashtag originate in 
Spain, we have already established that the volume of tweets featuring the hashtag was much 
larger in Greece and the UK. To illustrate how the use of the hashtag spread across Europe we 
generated a series of plots at hourly intervals after Sandro Maccarrone first used the hashtag. 
Figure 3 maps the frequency distribution from Figure 2 onto a map of Europe, to illustrate where 
the hashtag was first used and how it spread across Europe. Between 18:00 and 20:00 the density 
of engagement is greatest in Spain, but with some significant engagement towards the end in the 
UK and Greece. Thereafter engagement with the hashtag is greatest in Greece, and the UK, 
before quieting down after midnight. 
Figure 3: Geography of engagement with the hashtag over time. 
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To understand how the hashtag spread across Europe, and indeed the world, we need to 
examine how it was first shared. To do so we mapped the cross-border retweets, replies, or quotes 
of tweets that used the hashtag. These kinds of cross-border interactions occur when a tweet 
published by a user in one country (e.g. Ada Colau’s tweet using #ThisIsACoup) is retweeted, 
replied to, or quoted by a user in another country. We do this by aggregating interactions to the 
country level and visualising country links in a chord diagram where the frequency of 
interactions between countries (i.e. retweets, replies, or quotes) determine the width of a link (see 
Figure 4). What is revealed is that the most frequent cross-border interactions occur between 
Greece and the UK, followed by Greece and Spain, and then Greece and Belgium (included with 
‘Other’ in the diagram). Figure 4 illustrates that direct cross-border interactions were crucial to 
the geographic spread of the hashtag. Furthermore, it illustrates that connective action did not 
only involve collective engagement with the hashtag, but also direct engagements between 
Twitter users in diﬀerent European countries. Not only did people from across Europe coalesce 
around the same hashtag, but they also interacted with each other across borders on the issue. 
What is noteworthy about social media platforms in general, and #ThisIsACoup in 
particular, is the ease with which communications can spill across cultural, linguistic, and 
political borders, especially in the European context where these borders were often considered to 
be principal obstacles to the emergence of a European public sphere. Yet with #ThisIsACoup, a 
pan-European, indeed global, public communication space opened up. The hashtag created a 
virtual site for citizens from across Europe to come together in protest at the measures being 
imposed on Greece by its creditors. The sentiment the hashtag expressed was clear: seven years 
after the financial crash, here was another creditor forcing all the burden of adjustment on the 
narrowest of shoulders, while usurping its democratic right to self-determination. It took only 
four hours from the moment Maccarrone posted the first tweet that used the hashtag until it was 
adopted by Twitter users across Europe, ensuring that the hashtag gained widespread popularity 
while the bailout negotiations were still ongoing. The hashtag’s popularity also ensured its wider 
visibility, as the news media began reporting on this social media phenomenon.  
Figure 4: How those 
engaging with the 
hashtag interacted 
with each other 
across borders 
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Message and focus of tweets 
A thematic analysis of top tweets yields the expected thematic pattern. Tweets using the 
#ThisIsACoup hashtag expressed solidarity with Greece, and opposition to what is viewed as the 
undemocratic, humiliating, or downright cruel treatment it received from its creditors. Spanish 
tweets indicated strong support for Greece and demanded respect for the outcome of the Greek 
referendum (which had rejected the terms of the bailout). French tweets similarly noted the 
“cruelty” and “humiliation” that Greece was forced to endure, noting that even the Germans 
agreed, referring to an article in Der Spiegel entitled “A Catalogue of Cruelties.” Greek tweets 
seize on the “undemocratic” nature of the bailout. Italian tweets most frequently identify the 
Eurogroup as the culprit and displayed a strong sense of diﬀuse Euroscepticism. German top 
tweets are also unanimous in their criticism of the Eurogroup. While most countries have at least 
some top tweets critical of Germany, or less frequently of German finance minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble, in the sample we examined direct criticism of Germany is less prominent than we 
expected. The notable exception are top tweets originating from the UK, which more than any 
other point the finger at Germany. Articles and comments by the American Nobel Prize winning 
economist Paul Krugman, a vociferous critic of the bailout conditions, who called the 
Eurogroup’s demands “madness”, were also cited regularly in tweets from all countries. Overall, 
most of the tweets are clearly directed at creditors, calling on them to respect Greece and meet 
some of its demands. 
Impact on the mass media 
A powerful example of cross-media agenda-setting, the hashtag clearly impacted press 
reporting, with a total of 749 hits in our search that exactly matched ‘thisisacoup’. Two Greek 
newspapers alone had 10 articles matching the search term, Guardian had 11, Financial Times 
10, and Süddeutsche Zeitung 6, to name but a few. 
International news coverage that mentioned the hashtag was to a very large extent 
descriptive, noting its use as a grassroots response to what is perceived as the technocratic 
usurpation of the Greek people’s democratic mandate and a violation of Greek sovereignty. 
Newspapers generally link the hashtag to US economist Paul Krugman. German papers are 
similarly descriptive, with a Süddeutsche Zeitung article reporting on the group of Barcelona-
based activists who hatched the idea for the social media campaign. It discusses how German 
politicians of the Green and Social Democratic parties have also been opposed to the harsh 
conditions of the bailout deal. But one of the perhaps most noteworthy aspects of German 
coverage is its account of how much anger is directed towards Germany, noting also the 
emergence of a counter campaign #ThisIsNotACoup. More generally, German newspaper 
coverage reflects concern over the damage done to Germany’s reputation, and its international 
standing, particularly by Nazi comparisons. 
The British press covered the hashtag’s emergence too, noting the anti-German backlash 
and anti-German nature of many tweets. It also reports on an oﬀshoot campaign that uses 
#boycottgermany to call on people to refrain from buying German products. Two prominent 
articles note that not all tweets echo this anti-German sentiment, and that there is indeed 
disagreement between Twitter users. Notably an article in the Telegraph argues that “This is not a 
coup” while an article in the FT Magazine ponders the emergence and significance of hashtags 
more generally, and how they have aﬀected our communications and our thinking. 
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Spanish newspapers note that the international phenomenon was mostly very critical of 
Germany, though stopping short of editorialising, and criticised Nazi comparisons. Quoting 
tweets directly appears quite prominent in Spanish coverage, as well as discussions of the role and 
importance of Twitter. One article, for instance, discusses Twitter and notes how politicians 
participating in the summit use it to communicate the proceedings to the public. 
The Greek press was the most forthrightly partisan. The centre-right Kathimerini was 
broadly critical of the hashtag campaign, calling it counter productive. One article was titled 
“This is not a coup”. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the paper was not critical of the 
bailout agreement, but that its criticism was diﬀerent in character to that revealed in Greek 
tweets. Much of its criticism was directed towards Greece’s Syriza government. The centre-left To 
Vima reported that news coverage across Europe is discussing the destruction of European values 
at the hands of Germany, and notes that the hashtag is a global response thereto, as well as a 
rallying cry of support for the Greek government. To Vima’s coverage was relatively closely 
aligned with sentiment expressed in Greek tweets. It also notes how Pablo Iglesias, head of Spain’s 
left-wing Podemos party, used the hashtag in support of the Greek government. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The emergence of #ThisIsACoup is probably best described as a form of connective action 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). It originated and was spread on Twitter. Through the hashtag, 
Twitter acted as a stitching technology, activating disparate, far-flung groups around a common 
grievance (Bennett et al., 2014). The hashtag connected people across the continent by providing 
them a succinct message around which to coalesce. The threshold to participate was low. People 
could engage with it on their own terms, without a shared focus, identity, or the kind of 
organisational bureaucracy that coordinating collective action requires. When people from across 
Europe started tweeting about #ThisIsACoup they gave rise to a macro-level phenomenon of 
pan-European dissent. 
Like other instances of hashtag activism, it was a powerful way of making visible 
grassroots resistance to the bailout conditions that the creditors were seeking to impose on 
Greece. The rapid rise and geographic spread of #ThisIsACoup illustrates that national and 
linguistic boundaries are extremely porous on social media. Use of the hashtag scaled rapidly, as it 
spread from Spain to the rest of Europe in a matter of hours, rapidly gathering momentum in the 
interim. Without platforms such as Twitter, it seems unlikely that grassroots movements could 
have coordinated so rapidly to communicate their grievances. 
But people did more than engage with a common hashtag; they also engaged with other 
Twitter users across national boundaries. It seems likely that people who participated in the 
Spanish Indignados, Greek Aganaktismenoi, and Portugese Geração were activated by and 
engaged with #ThisIsACoup, not least because these movements themselves mobilised through 
comparable connective actions (Theocharis, 2016). By stitching together people from across 
Europe, and facilitating engagement across boundaries, Twitter opened a transnational 
communications space, enabling this Europe-wide public display of resistance. It is hard to 
imagine how those who had serious misgivings about the bailout negotiations in Greece could 
have joined forces and signalled collective opposition with people from across Europe, and 
indeed the rest of the world, in the absence of such a stitching technology. The hashtag allowed 
people from across Europe with similar grievances to find each other, by coalescing around the 
 11
#ThisIsACoup Hänska & Bauchowitz
same digital message, encapsulated by #ThisIsACoup, to synchronously express their grievance 
and dismay. 
The eﬀectiveness of connective action in opening up a pan-European public space for 
protest was amplified when the hashtag came to influence the news agenda. Communications 
that started out on Twitter quickly spilled over into the press. In the two weeks following the 
hashtag’s emergence, newspaper articles around the world mentioned the hashtag, mostly 
describing its emergence and the message it was communicating, but clearly acknowledging the 
grassroots nature of the protest. As such it managed to reach an audience well beyond active 
Twitter users and enter mainstream public discourse. It would have been hard for an attentive 
European audience to miss this pan-European expression of opposition to the bailout conditions 
demanded of Greece. However, #ThisIsACoup does not appear to have crossed the threshold into 
more sustained forms of collective action, with deeper organisational structures, a shared identity, 
and clear common goals. Attention to the hashtag, and the coalition that coalesced around it, did 
lend visibility to pan-European resistance, but engagement itself fizzled as fast as it scaled, absent 
organisational structures to sustain the coordination of this pan-European network. 
As controversial austerity policies continue to be implemented in Europe, social media 
emerged as a potent means of connecting people from across the continent to voice their 
objection in concert. Importantly, it opened a transnational communication space that 
eﬀortlessly traversed national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries, and extended the reach of the 
dissenting message by carrying it into news reports. The fact that people did more than engage 
with the hashtag, but interacted with others across the continent, illustrates that a genuine pan-
European communication space opened up. 
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